Introduction 

The European Union’s (EU) approach to the 2015 Migration Crisis has been described as a ‘complete and utter failure’ (Börzel, 2016, p.9), which has demonstrated that existing the European migration structures were wholly inadequate in dealing with the influx of asylum seekers (Scipioni, 2018). The EU’s disunity was epitomised by the Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, who remarked that ‘there is still no European solution in sight … [thus], it is necessary for us to take national measures’ (Zalan, 2016). In contrast, Europe’s most recent response to the arrival of Ukrainian refugees as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been described as unprecedented and stands in stark contrast to the approach taken in 2015. Given the fact that the number of Ukrainian refugees constituted a much larger intake of refugees than in 2015 (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hoffmann, 2022), one must question whether this marks a shift away from the ‘long-standing deterrence’ approach of EU asylum policy (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan, 2017). 
 

The literature in regard to the causal factors of the 2015 Migration Crisis can be categorised into three broad areas. Firstly, the low level of harmonisation amongst member states in regard to asylum policy stunted the ability of the EU to implement effect and decisive action when responding to the crisis (Trauner, 2016). Secondly, policy decisions at the EU-level were often poorly implemented which led to a disjointed and uncoordinated approach. Weak implementation compounds the underlying and structural issues with EU asylum policy (Micinski, 2022). Finally, the lack of solidarity mechanisms to allow burden sharing of refugees has been widely criticised and identified as a crucial area in dire need of reform (Carrera et al., 2015). These three factors will be examined in greater detail to demonstrate the failure of the EU’s asylum policy in 2015.
 

The 2015 Migration Crisis will be contrasted with the remarkable decision to trigger the Temporary Protection Directive in response to the Ukraine Refugee Crisis which resulted in a more effective management of the situation. By identifying the factors that distinguish the approach taken to the arrival of Ukrainian refugees from the 2015 response this paper will contend that this policy shift does not signal an intent on the part of the EU to overhaul its existing asylum policy. While the discussion thus far has emphasised the importance of identity and geopolitical factors (Bosse, 2022); when one examines the differentiation in rhetoric as well as the future of EU asylum policy, it is clear that greater weight should be placed on racism as an explanatory factor and that the EU is maintaining its deterrence-based asylum policy.

 

The 2015 Migration Crisis 

During 2015, over one million migrants sought asylum in the EU (Geddes, 2022, p.394). This constituted less than 0.2% of the EU’s population and paled in comparison to the enormous intakes of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon (Lavenex, 2018, p.1196). In Lebanon alone, there were 1,146,405 Syrian refugees which meant that nearly one in every five people was a Syrian refugee (Ostrand, 2015, p.256). Geddes (2022) notes that some have queried whether the events of 2015 can be accurately characterised as a ‘refugee crisis’ given that in comparison to less-developed nations Europe hosted relatively few asylum seekers. Rather it appears more appropriate that it be framed as a crisis of European governance and politics given the deficient nature of the European system of  resettlement. 
 

At the peak of the crisis the unmanaged influx of refugees totally overwhelmed EU border countries such as Greece and Italy (Trauner, 2016). The asylum procedures and reception conditions were found to have ‘systemic dysfunctionalities’ rendering them unfit to deal with the crisis (Nikolić and Pevcin, 2022). A lack of capacity led to the ‘collapse of the Dublin system’ (Heldt, 2017), which in turn resulted in some states reinstating internal EU border controls, temporarily suspending the Schengen Agreement (Nikolić and Pevcin, 2022). The EU was ill-equipped to deal with the crisis, creating the necessity of divided action from national governments (Menéndez, 2016). It would be unfair to state that Europe made no positive contribution to the crisis, albeit it was one that was relatively limited. The Union provided a large amount of financial aid for Syrian refugees (Ostrand, 2015) and funding for Frontex (The European Border and Coast Agency) was increased (Micinski, 2022). Ultimately, these measures were completely inadequate and served as sticking-plasters for a woefully inadequate asylum system.
 

Low Harmonisation 
A key weakness of EU asylum policy has been the lack of harmonisation between member states (Trauner, 2016). National governments maintained significant control over migration issues and a comprehensive Union-wide asylum policy still does not exist (Micinski, 2022). There have been partially successful attempts to harmonise asylum procedures through the Common European Asylum System in relation to common standards for receiving refugees, processing claims, and providing protection (Ostrand, 2015). However, this only sets minimum standards as opposed to expansive harmonisation measures, which would genuinely bring Member States in line. 
 

European asylum policy has been characterised by intergovernmentalist decision-making where Member States have been generally reluctant to cede power to the Commission (Uçarer, 2022). Examining the development of asylum policy from the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, which set migration issues aside in the ‘Third Pillar’, one can see that there is an in-built reluctance for full harmonisation. The result of placing  asylum policy in the Third Pillar was immigration and asylum policies remaining the exclusive competence of the Member States. Any change at a European level to matters set out in the Second and Third pillars required unanimity from national governments in the Council of the EU (Micinski, 2022, p.51). The Lisbon Treaty has since ‘communitarised’ asylum issues into the shared competency of both Member States and EU institutions. However, this did not result in a substantial shift from the policy status-quo (Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2014).  
 

In regard to the Schengen Area, an integral part of the European asylum system, member states can temporarily opt out of the agreement at any stage on the basis of security concerns (Chari and Kritzinger, 2006). In both 2011 (as a result of the Arab Spring) and in 2015, border checks were reinstated within the EU as member states acted as unitary actors and were unwilling ‘to engage in burden sharing’ (Eylemer and Söylemez, 2020, p.336). Without having complete harmonisation, Europe was only able to implement limited change as opposed to the decisive and substantial actions which were necessary to deal with the 2015 migration crisis.   

 

Weak Implementation 
The low harmonisation between member states is compounded by the fact that many national governments have a poor record at fully transposing and implementing EU asylum law (Carrera et al., 2015). States are provided wide discretion when implementing EU law which has resulted in refugees receiving vastly different levels of treatment (Trauner, 2016) and a ‘disproportionate pressure on first-arrival countries’ (Basile and Olmastroni, 2020, p.671). The fast pace of European legislation (Hampshire, 2016), mistranslations, and a lack of political will (Micinski, 2022) have all contributed to legal variances across states. This failure of implementation is facilitated by weak monitoring from the Commission (Scipioni, 2018), which has resulted in a large gap between policy and practices (Nikolić and Pevcin, 2022). The differences in implementation leads to ‘horizontal conflicts’ between states as  the ‘lack of efficiency and centralisation’ (Chari and Kritzinger, 2006, p.180) causes Members States to compete at how ‘to most effectively deter migrants’ (Nikolić and Pevcin, 2022, p.251). Asylum policy should be dealt with on a supranational basis in order to address the current dysfunctional and asymmetric system.
 

The difference between policy and practice can be seen in the failure to properly implement core provisions of the Dublin regulations, which is the set of rules that governs the EU’s asylum policy. The Dublin system states that the country of first-entry is responsible for a migrant’s asylum claim and requires the fingerprinting of refugees to ensure compliance (Lavenex, 2018). However, this system was not properly implemented (Scipioni, 2018) with accusations that Italy had refrained from fingerprinting (Trauner, 2016). This led to large numbers of refugees undertaking secondary movements from their ‘first-country-of-entry’ and lodging their claim in other states such as Sweden which violated the Dublin regulations (Lutz et al., 2020).
 

One of the defining moments of the 2015 crisis was Angel Merkel’s decision to allow any Syrian refugee to seek asylum in Germany. This unilateral action completely disregarded the Dublin system’s first-country-of-entry principle. This marked ‘the effective collapse of the Dublin system’ demonstrating that EU asylum policy was broken and incapable of coping with the crisis (Geddes, 2022, p.395). Germany’s derogation was prompted by the fact that border countries such as Italy had already disregarded the Dublin system by allowing refugees to move to their country of preference (Trauner, 2016). This created a cyclical interaction where border countries were encouraged to continue ignoring the Dublin regulations by sending on refugees to northern Member States which led to the total breakdown of EU asylum policy (Lavenex, 2018). 

 

Lack of Solidarity 
The principle of ‘first-country-of-entry’ imposed by the Dublin regulations as discussed above, resulted in ‘unequal refugee burden sharing throughout the Union’ (Eylemer and Söylemez, 2020). The lack of any relocation provisions meant countries such as Greece and Italy hosted a disproportionate number of asylum seekers (Basile and Olmastroni, 2020). This led to the capacity of frontline states being overwhelmed resulting in ‘systematically deficient’ humanitarian conditions and asylum processing procedures (Carrera et al., 2015, p.13). Prior to 2015 countries like Greece were already experiencing a heavy burden which they were unable to adequately manage. This was demonstrated by the 2011 Court of Justice of the European Union pronouncement that characterised the Greek asylum system as dysfunctional due to a number of factors. These included inadequate detention facilities, poor living conditions, and a lack of proper procedure in assessing asylum applications (Lavenex, 2018). The absence of European solidarity in regard to the distribution of asylum seekers is one of the primary causes for ‘hindering the effectiveness of EU asylum policy’ (Carrera et al., 2015, p. 13). Despite the fact that there were claims that the Dublin regulations were never envisioned to provide for the equitable redistribution of asylum seekers across the EU (Micinski, 2022) they were inadequate in dealing with this refugee crisis and their effectiveness in dealing with future refugee crises is uncertain
 

In 2015, as part of the European Agenda on Migration the EU sought to introduce temporary solidarity mechanisms to alleviate pressure on frontline states (Eylemer and Söylemez, 2020). In spite of significant opposition (Fine, 2019) the EU Council decided to temporarily suspend the Dublin system and that up to 160,000 asylum seekers would be relocated among member states as a result (Carrera et al., 2015). While this represented a positive development, the execution of the decision unfortunately proved less than satisfactory. Given that fewer than 28,000 refugees were actually relocated this only serves to highlight another example of weak implementation on the part of the bloc (Geddes, 2022). It should be noted however, that the subsequent Turkey-EU Settlement had reduced the overall influx of asylum seekers (Eylemer and Söylemez, 2020). The Settlement provided that Turkey would take back all migrants and refugees who had crossed into Greece irregularly in return for funding from the EU. Arguably, this simply shifted the burden outside the EU and provided no long-term solution to the inadequate state of the European asylum system.

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Ukrainian Refugee Response 

Europe’s response to Ukrainian refugees has been united, decisive, and relatively successful, particularly when compared with the 2015 crisis (De Coninck, 2023). The UNHCR (2024) estimates that over 6 million Ukrainians have fled the country, since the outbreak of the war,  with the EU reporting that nearly 4.2 million are currently registered as refugees in Member States (2024). Poland received more refugees in the space of two weeks than the number accommodated by the entire EU during 2015 (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hoffmann, 2022). Despite this massive increase in the number of refugees as compared to 2015, according to Näre, Abdelhady, and Irastorza (2022) the initial influx of Ukrainians was not portrayed by the media as a ‘refugee crisis’ in the same manner as in 2015. Many of the issues previously highlighted such as a lack of harmonisation and solidarity have been overcome through the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD). Given the contested history of migration issues within the EU, the decision to activate the directive within the space of one week is remarkable. The Council of the EU voted in favour of implementation a mere one day after the Commission proposed the adoption of the Directive (Bosse, 2022).
 

Temporary Protection Directive 
The TPD was designed in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars to deal with a sudden and large influx of asylum seekers (Ostrand, 2015). The implementation of the TPD for Ukrainian refugees marked the first time the EU has opted to take such an action. The TPD allows Ukrainian refugees to choose which member state to attach their temporary protection to as opposed to being required to stay in their ‘country-of-first-entry’ (Chachko and Linos, 2022). Ukrainian refugees have not been asked to engage in complicated administrative procedures and have been immediately given rights to reside, work and access healthcare (Bosse, 2022). The TPD promotes ‘solidarity and burden-sharing among EU states’ (Ostrand, 2015, p.271) which distinguishes itself from previous European asylum measures (Orchard and Chatty, 2014). İneli-Ciğer posits that the TPD achieves harmonisation and effective solidarity, making it ‘the right framework to respond to the mass displacements’ (2022). Given the TPD’s efficiency at dealing with such a large influx of refugees, this raises the question of why was it not previously implemented? 
 

The Commission had considered activating the TPD in 2011 to deal with the Libyan Refugee Crisis and again during the 2015 crisis. However, on both occasions this approach was rejected by national governments (Bosse, 2022). İneli-Ciğer (2017) previously theorised that the reasons for non-implementation concerned issues such as lengthy activation procedures and the fear of creating a ‘pull factor’ for migrants. In light of the Ukrainian situation, İneli-Ciğer (2022) ultimately concluded that it was simply a lack of political will that prevented the activation of the TPD before the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. While in 2011 the number of Libyan refugees were significantly lower than the current influx, the Italian asylum system was still overwhelmed and the Italian government’s request to activate the TPD was rejected. EU officials have contended that previous refugee crises were ‘very different’ (Henley, 2022). 
 

What Makes Ukraine Different? 

European Identity 
While the unprecedented nature of responsibility-sharing for Ukraine has been lauded, the disparity of responses between the various refugee crises has been widely criticised. At the outset of the crisis, multiple European leaders made reference to the idea of a ‘shared European identity as the rhetorical basis for the special solidarity afforded to Ukraine. President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen made repeated reference to the idea that ‘Ukraine shares our values’ as well as consistently stating that ‘Ukraine belongs to the European family’ (2022). An analysis of speeches made in the European Parliament showed that MEPs often use inclusive and collective language when discussing Ukrainian refugees using phrases such as ‘our fellow Europeans’ or ‘our European brothers’ (Toader, 2023). By emphasising the idea of a shared identity where there are common European ‘ideals, beliefs and value systems’ serve to strengthen the argument that special support should be offered to Ukraine.
 

Arguably, the notion of emphasising a shared European identity as a rationale, can simply serve to conceal a more bigoted rationale for the differentiation in treatment for refugees from different countries. The Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov made an overtly xenophobic justification stating that Ukrainian refugees were ‘intelligent’ unlike the ‘refugee wave[s] we have been used to’. Petkov went on to state that individuals arriving during previous refugee crises had ‘unclear pasts’ and insinuated that some refugees from Syria may have been terrorists (Berlinger, 2022). 
 

Geopolitical Considerations
Pettrachin and Abdou (2022) reject the notion that the unique triggering of the TPD can be explained solely from the perspective of xenophobia. İneli-Ciğer (2022) argues that there is a multiplicity of factors that explain the current response of the EU and that one must consider the geopolitical threat of Russia as well as the geographical proximity of Ukraine when examining the issue. The act of Russia committing a full-scale invasion in Ukraine fundamentally reconfigured the existing European security paradigm. There was an increased realist and moral basis for EU solidarity towards Ukraine as Russia posed an existential threat to the European bloc (Bosse, 2022). In addition, considering Ukraine borders four EU member states, its geographic position means that individuals in the EU have a more ‘direct contact’ and understanding of the conflict which has forced the Ukrainian refugees to leave their home (Pettrachin and Abdou, 2022).
 

Interrogating the geographic point, the presence of one third country between Syria and the EU should not negate the provision of a significant response to those refugees. Similarly, while the Russian geopolitical threat was clearly an important issue, due regard should also be given to the heightened concern about terrorist attacks in Europe during 2015. ISIS, who were active combatants in the Syrian Civil War, never constituted a geopolitical threat to Europe but the idea of extremist Islamic terror attack was a top national security issue for many EU member states (Fenwick, 2016). This is not to say that Russia aggression or proximity of Ukraine to the EU played an insignificant role in triggering the TPD but simply that similar considerations were also at play in 2015.
 

Racism
This paper accepts the premise of Pettrachin and Abdou (2022) that the bases for certain policy choices are of course multi-causal and no single factor can have sole explanatory power. However, it is important to acknowledge the problematic role racism and bigotry plays in the determination of asylum policy. This focus is made more acute by the lack of acknowledgment at an official level of the role prejudice played in the inadequate response to the 2015 Migration Crisis (Georgi, 2019). Wilde (2022) notes that on a political level there has been no acknowledgment or accountability for the way white Europeans have been afforded privileged treatment as compared to vulnerable individuals who are Arab or Muslim. Moreover, the lack of engagement from certain academics on the issue only goes to further the notion that explanatory weight of racism is undervalued. 
 

Non-white refugees from Afghanistan and Syria have not been afforded the same support as Ukrainian asylum seekers due to the unfair ‘perceived threat’ they pose to a country’s norms and values (De Coninck and Matthijs, 2020). Moreover, ethnicity played a significant role with research demonstrating that the European public ‘prefers migrants with the same ethnicity over [other] migrants’ (De Coninck, 2023). This point is further supported by the fact that Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland all refused to admit Muslim refugees. The right-wing Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán states that ‘to keep Europe Christian. . . . There is no alternative, and we have no option but to defend our borders’ (Micinski, 2022). The media at the time had a key role in perpetuating and enabling these problematic viewpoints. Elements of the coverage demonstrate the comparative lens of prejudice that was applied to Ukraine in contrast with  Syria. One ITV journalist stated ‘now the unthinkable has happened to them. And this is not a developing, third world nation. This is Europe!’ This comment was not individualised with one contributor in a BBC interview emphasising the fact that victims were ‘European people with blue eyes and blond hair.’ Finally, one French journalist commented that ‘We’re not talking here about Syrians fleeing bombing …We’re talking about Europeans leaving in cars that look like ours ’ (Bayoumi, 2022). 

 

The Future of Asylum Policy
Despite the success and effectiveness of the European contribution to the Ukrainian situation, it appears unlikely that it signals a meaningful shift in EU asylum policy and will not become a ‘blueprint’ for future crises. Notably the Ukrainian approach ‘is operating in tandem with the alternative, restrictive approach that operates for other refugees’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hoffmann, 2022, p. 214). In addition, the relocation mechanism instituted during 2015 was only temporary and did not replace the Dublin system (Trauner, 2016). 
 

By 2020, the EU had recognised the failure of the European Agenda on Migration at addressing migration issues and thus the Commission set out a new Pact on Migration and Asylum. Due to the contentious nature of asylum policy in Europe progress on the new proposals have been gradual (Micinski, 2022) and while a provisional deal was accepted at the end of 2023, the Council and the Parliament must still formally adopt the laws. While the Pact does include the necessary inclusion of solidarity mechanisms member states will be able to opt out of accepting refugees by instead choosing to make a monetary contribution into a joint EU fund. If member states are able to buy their way out of burden-sharing it is difficult to see how such a solidarity mechanism will be effective in actuality. The Pact does not constitute a radical overhaul of the current system and human rights groups have criticised the proposed laws as unworkable and cruel (Henley, 2023). Catherine Woollard, the Director of the European Centre on Refugees and Exiles criticised the attempt by the EU to adopt hostile policies in order to deter migrants on the basis that ‘in practice people will still arrive because they have no choice, so there’s no deterrent effect – just the suffering’ (Barigazzi, 2024). Instead of addressing the problems, proposed reforms serve to entrench and continue the ‘long-standing deterrence paradigm’ of EU asylum policy (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan, 2017). 
 

Conclusion
This paper has argued that the EU’s approach at addressing the 2015 Migration Crisis was unsuccessful and failed to contribute significantly to supporting asylum seekers. While the Ukraine situation is an exception it does not necessarily signal a radical change to existing policy. The new Pact on Migration and Asylum fails to adequately address many of the key issues highlighted by the 2015 crisis and has instead adopted a harsh deterrence system allowing opt-outs from the key solidarity mechanisms. In order to provide to better deal with migration crises in the future, European asylum policy should increase the levels of burden-sharing and solidarity among states as well as moving from a ‘security-centric focus towards a multi-sector policy approach’ (Carrera et al., 2015, p.20-21) administered through supranational governance structures.

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