Abstracts

It is a misconception that deliberation is solely associated with democracy. Indeed, an increasing number of deliberative experiments are being conducted in authoritarian governments, particularly in China. While many theoretical and empirical studies on authoritarian deliberation in China exist, few efforts have been made to examine these studies about the contemporary political landscape of China, in particular Xi Jinping's consolidated personal control since his assumption of office as President of China in 2012. Therefore, it remains unknown whether deliberation practices today pose a threat to democratization for the Chinese government. This essay examines the research question: “Do deliberation practices in China contribute to the stabilization or destabilization of its authoritarian regime?” The essay will analyse several key factors enabling deliberation to primarily function as a strategy of resilience in authoritarian China. Moreover, it will explore the potential destabilising consequences introduced by deliberation. This essay uses the case studies of deliberative polling in Zeguo and consultative elections in Ya'an to examine these complex trade-offs surrounding deliberative reforms in greater depth. To conclude, this paper will argue that, on balance, deliberation practices in contemporary China serve more to stabilize than undermine Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authoritarian dominance. By boosting governance responsiveness and flexibility within strict bounds, managed deliberation helps the regime pre-empt and deflate pressures for substantive democratization.

Introduction

China has a long and rich history of deliberative practices dating back thousands of years (He, 2013). While the concepts of deliberation and democracy are closely intertwined in Western political theory, China's authoritarian system developed its own distinct forms of deliberation aimed at enhancing governance and bolstering regime legitimacy rather than empowering citizens (He, 2013). Research on how deliberative practices interact with and influence authoritarian regimes remains relatively sparse in English-language scholarship. This essay aims to help fill that gap by examining the deliberative reforms undertaken in China and analysing whether they serve to stabilize or undermine the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) authoritarian dominance.

The analysis will first explore key factors that have contributed to the CCP's adoption of deliberation as a governance strategy to enhance regime resilience. It will then investigate potential destabilizing consequences that deliberative openings could introduce over time. Additionally, drawing on case studies from the township of Zeguo and Ya'an, the complexities and contradictions of China's deliberative reforms will be delved into in greater depth. Ultimately, the essay will argue that, while not without risks, the CCP's deliberative practices tend to stabilize rather than undermine its authoritarian rule.
 

Understanding the role that deliberation plays in buttressing authoritarianism in China is highly relevant given Xi Jinping's continuing promotion of “consultative democracy” as a key part of the Chinese governance model. As deliberative practices become more institutionalized, analysing their implications for the longevity of the CCP's authoritarian system takes on increasing importance for both scholars and policy makers.​

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Literature review

Authoritarian Deliberation in China
Deliberation generally refers to communication that involves exchanging reasons and arguments to influence policy preferences (He and Warren, 2017). In a democracy, deliberation can empower citizens to participate in issues impacting their lives, known as deliberative citizenship (He, 2018). However, several articles explore the concept of “authoritarian deliberation,” where unelected leaders use controlled deliberation to gain information and approval without relinquishing decision-making power (He and Warren, 2017). In China, these practices include village elections, public hearings, deliberative polls, and forums for public consultation and participation (He and Warren, 2011). It is believed that the CCP has several motivations for engaging in these practices, such as managing potential dissents by ordinary Chinese citizens, providing platforms for businesses in its marketizing economy, and improving their governance (He and Warren, 2017). 
 

Local-level deliberative innovations in China combine traditional discussion methods like “heart-to-heart talks” with approaches like deliberative polling and elections (He, 2018). Deliberative elections have resolved issues such as infrastructure budgeting in Zeguo and the allocation of economic benefits to married women in Dayawan District (He, 2018), built deliberative citizenship (He, 2018), and increased local government’s legitimacy (He and Thøgersen, 2010). However, two issues continue to hinder sincere discourse: agenda control by officials and a lack of a monitoring system (He and Thøgersen, 2010). 
 

Consequently, there is debate about whether authoritarian deliberation is conceptually coherent. He and Warren (2011) argue that authoritarian deliberation is logically possible, empirically existent, and functionally motivated in China and that deliberative processes can occur in authoritarian regimes. Conversely, theorists like Habermas (1994), Cohen (1996) and Dryzek (2009) contend that deliberation originates from democratic motivations such as expanding the range of matters under democratic governance and enhancing the efficacy or legitimacy of democratic participation.
 

Moreover, the regime impacts of deliberation are also debated. He and Thøgersen (2010) argue that outcomes likely depend on elite motivations and the localised, controlled use of deliberative forums. He and Warren wrote two papers on the broader consequences of these practices over the course of six years. In 2011, they concluded that it could potentially change expectations towards inclusion and voting rights. However, in 2017, they were less confident in their previous proclamation, as they acknowledged heightened pressures on dissidents since Xi Jinping assumed office. Therefore, they concluded that deliberation may stabilize authoritarianism by demobilizing opposition and increasing governance efficiency. Recent work also explores integrations of meritocratic and deliberative institutions as alternatives to democratization (Bitton, 2022). Lastly, it is noted through the examination of the scholarship on deliberative practices in China that there is a substantial decrease in the occurrence of these practices under Xi Jinping's rule.

 

In comparison with electoral authoritarianism
Authoritarian deliberation is a related but distinct concept to electoral authoritarianism when considering political practices in non-democratic regimes like China. Electoral authoritarianism refers to regimes that hold regular elections for national legislatures and executives but in which incumbent authoritarian rulers use a variety of means to severely restrict true competition and heavily favour themselves and their allies winning (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Therefore, elections are held but are not truly free and fair, serving more as a tool for authoritarian control and creating a veneer of democracy than genuine contestation for power. Authoritarian deliberative practices, on the other hand, aim to solicit public input and involve citizens in decision-making to some degree, but within the broader context of authoritarian rule, where the regime maintains ultimate control (He and Thøgersen, 2010). The key difference is that electoral authoritarianism focuses on national elections as controlled performances (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009), while authoritarian deliberation highlights more local, issue-based forums for public consultation and participation allowed by the authoritarian state, albeit in a limited and tightly managed way. Authoritarian deliberation manifests in China through the use of deliberative practices at sub-national levels of governance as a means of soliciting public input and participation within the constraints of one-party rule (He, 2018). Conversely, China holds regular elections for legislatures like the National People’s Congress that are, although not semi-competitive, unfair elections that characterise electoral authoritarian regimes.

 

Xi Jinping's leadership style
Xi Jinping has established a distinct leadership style characterized as a “strongman” model of authoritarian control (Tsang and Cheung, 2022), which can be contrasted with the more collective consensus model of  his predecessors (Chan et al., 2020). First, since assuming office, he has aimed to reassert Communist Party dominance and authority within a revived ideological framework of Marxism-Leninism (Tsang and Cheung, 2022). For example, he has consolidated extensive formal powers over ideology, policy, military, economy, and personnel appointments (Tsang and Cheung, 2022). This concentration of control in Xi's hands marks a shift away from institutionalized power-sharing norms that had taken hold after Mao (He and Warren, 2020). 
 

Secondly, Xi demands absolute loyalty and conformity from officials while enforcing ideological orthodoxy, eliminating dissent, and expanding censorship (Tsang and Cheung, 2022; Han, 2021). He invokes external threats and nationalism to justify the domestic repression of opposition voices as “unpatriotic.” Recent examples of this include the prosecution of members of Hong Kong’s political opposition and the demolition of churches and mosques (Tsang and Cheung, 2022). Political discourse under Xi has greater censorship, propaganda controls, and fewer checks from civil society (Tsang and Cheung, 2022; He and Warren, 2020).The media, academia, and culture also face stricter ideological constraints, along with the arrest of dissenting voices (Tsang and Cheung, 2022). Consequently, the space for pluralistic discourse and policy debate under Xi has markedly narrowed (He and Warren, 2020; Tsang and Cheung, 2022). 
 

Lastly, Xi demands sycophantic displays and ritualized praise from subordinates (Tsang and Cheung, 2022). This chilling effect propagates down administrative hierarchies, distorting both information flows to the top and accountability to the public. Ultimately, Xi's aggressive power consolidation tactics likely undermine the system's long-run resilience despite short-term effectiveness gains (Chan et al., 2020)

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Background

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Stabalizing factors of authoritarian deliberation in China

In the context of the stabilizing factors of deliberative practices, various strategies work in favour of China's authoritarian regime for the maintenance of social order and political control. One notable approach is providing a platform to express their discontent through controlled channels of expression. This involves co-opting dissent through mechanisms such as low-level elections (Cai, 2008). The CCP's relentless focus on staying in power is evident in its use of inducements to eliminate or neutralize challenges to its authority, coupled with continuous governance reform aimed at pre-empting demands for democratization (Tsang, 2009). Additionally, the CCP actively promotes consultative and deliberative processes to replace outdated ideologies, allowing some degree of public voice while maintaining strict control (Warren, 2009). Deliberative practices, conducted regularly and frequently, have proven effective in reducing dissent, social conflict, and complaints, ultimately saving resources used for exit strategies (He and Warren, 2011).
 

Information gathering plays a crucial role in maintaining stability, with a commitment to enhancing the Party's capacity to understand and respond to changing public opinion, including the utilization of the Internet for consultation (Tsang, 2009). However, challenges persist in acquiring accurate and comprehensive information, making deliberative processes essential for gaining insight into societal preferences and policy effectiveness. 
 

Engaging business stakeholders in decision-making is another stabilizing factor, considering the increasing influence and power of the business sector in the Chinese economy. The CCP recognizes the necessity of consultations between public and private interests, particularly as economic development generates new social capacities and demands. This is evidenced in areas like rural health care and land management, where abuses and tensions have led to local protests, petition movements, and public debate calling for better regulation (Heilmann, 2008). The transition to a quasi-market economy further emphasizes the importance of engaging business stakeholders to navigate conflicts arising from market-oriented reforms (Nathan, 2003; Cai, 2008). In this case, the deliberative practices facilitate the involvement of business stakeholders.
 

On the other hand, transparency and corruption mitigation contribute to stability by avoiding the perception of decisions influenced by business elites. Efforts to improve the rule of law and contain corruption, though present, still lack systemic checks and balances (Tsang, 2009). Deliberative decision-making becomes a tool to appear responsive to transparency concerns and mitigate accusations of decisions influenced by developers and business elites (Leib and He, 2006). 
 

Sharing responsibility and blame in China is achieved by creating a perception that decisions are collective and inclusive, reducing individual accountability. Deliberative processes, such as those observed in Wenling City, exemplify the initiation of decision-making through governmental organizations establishing deliberative meetings or forums (Leib and He, 2006). Generating legitimacy becomes imperative for the regime as development-oriented policies create winners and losers (He and Warren, 2011). Through governance reforms and nationalist propaganda, the CCP shapes public discourse and narratives around its policies and the deliberative processes. The party seeks to establish performance-based and nationalist legitimacy through this curated narrative, compensating for the lack of electoral legitimacy (Warren, 2009; Tsang, 2009; Nathan, 2003). Deliberative polling enhances citizens' trust in local government (He and Thøgersen, 2010).

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Destabalizing factors of authoritarian deliberation in China

Deliberation practices present a significant challenge to the stability of authoritarian regimes. While inclusion is a fundamental aspect of democratic legitimacy, authoritarian regimes thrive on maintaining tight control through centralized power. Deliberation erodes this control by distributing decision-making power. For deliberation to persuasively generate legitimacy, those affected need to feel included. If major stakeholders are excluded, they are unlikely to view the deliberative process as legitimate and may refuse to cooperate with the decision. Therefore, authoritarian rulers relying on deliberative legitimacy have a motivation to make the deliberative process inclusive of all affected parties. This was demonstrated in Zeguo, where attempts to include affected individuals in public hearings failed, leading to the implementation of random selection methods to ensure representation (He and Thøgersen, 2010). 
 

The changed expectations of citizens further contribute to destabilization. When authoritarian regimes allow some deliberative processes and citizen participation, it creates expectations among citizens that they should have a continued say. In Zeguo, for instance, citizens now expect the government to conduct annual deliberative polls, creating discontent when decisions are made without such consultations (He and Warren, 2011). This creates pressure on the authorities to continue providing deliberative spaces and mechanisms for citizen input, even if their original intent was just to pay lip service to public participation. Once raised, it becomes difficult for regimes to simply retract or dial back the democratic reform of allowing deliberation.
 

Moreover, the institutionalization of decision-making procedures further exacerbates the destabilizing factors. This institutionalization, driven by elite desires to control political demands, outlines detailed procedures for participant selection and meeting conduct, solidifying the influence of authoritative figures. 
 

Lastly, the logic of inclusive deliberation can lead authorities in authoritarian regimes towards adopting voting mechanisms over time. In cases where, even after deliberation, conflicting interests remain unresolved, authorities find themselves deferring to other mechanisms like voting to resolve matters. This can take the form of holding votes in public meetings, putting decisions to community referendums, or deferring to elected local legislatures to vote on contentious matters. While initially just intended to reinforce state capacity, these voting mechanisms end up diffusing some decision-making power and creating channels for democratic input.

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Case Studies

 

Zergo a Series of Deliberative Polling

The Zeguo case study replicated Fishkin's deliberative polling model and involved a series of deliberative polling experiments from 2004-2007 led by party secretary Jiang Zhaohua. This was during the Hu Jintao era, prior to Xi Jinping becoming the paramount leader. It engaged 275 randomly selected residents, predominantly male, in small groups and plenary sessions to determine the allocation of funds for infrastructure projects. The results demonstrated a significant reallocation of funds, with increased funding for pensions and decreased funding for pavilion redevelopment. 
 

Strengths of the approach included its ability to directly shape public outcomes. Deliberate polling resulted in the selection of the top 12 projects, all of which were committed to construction, exerting a real influence on the development of local infrastructure. Moreover, they empowered citizen participation through random selection for broad representation. This inclusivity helped maintain legitimacy and transparency in the government by securing official commitments to implement top-rated projects. The deliberative format also exposed leaders directly to public judgments and priorities beyond partisan interests. However, limitations were evident in the tight alignment with CCP ideology and the absence of an independent monitoring system. Final decisions still rest with party officials, and the political reforms were limited to administrative areas within the accepted framework of central leadership. Subsequently, those who were less inclined to leave their homes for construction projects were persuaded, as they recognised the need for and benefits of the construction projects. This potentially jeopardises the legitimacy of the deliberative process. 
 

Stabilizing effects centred on expanding public input while maintaining party control over outcomes and key decisions. For example, the local leadership explicitly committed to implementing the chosen projects, therefore increasing government transparency and legitimacy. Furthermore, the Party Secretary acknowledged that expanded participation provided more legitimacy even while surrendering some power. Lastly, they avoided relinquishing decision-making power as it upheld CCP frameworks and centralized leadership. On the other hand, destabilizing potential lies in cultivating more active and community-focused citizens through repeated deliberative polling over time. By shifting political culture and expectations gradually, the controlled opening could generate public demands for further democratization and challenge CCP ideological dominance.

 

​Ya'an - deliberation in the form of consultative elections

The case study of Ya'an involved consultative township leader elections introduced in 2006 by party secretary Zhang Linming. In the township of over 23,000 people, 90 candidates met the requirements; 67 ran for office, with 58 being members of the CCP. The candidates competed in a public process involving campaign posters, speeches, household visits, etc. Voters could directly evaluate candidates, though appointments were still controlled by party committees. For example, candidates with fewer votes were allocated to positions ahead of more popular ones.
 

The strengths of this study centred on expanding public input by providing voters with a direct expression of their opinions on township leaders and exposing local leaders to voter judgments beyond party-controlled selections. Moreover, the process received higher-level support as it was tailored to central leadership directives and presented as a means for elected leaders to be “welcomed by the masses.” Yet substantial limitations were evident in the lack of reforms to party control and appointment decisions. Therefore, without expanded citizen power, the consultations provided only a veneer of participation. 
 

Stabilizing effects focused on maintaining party dominance despite increased participation. Outcomes reinforced CCP authority in appointments and restrictive pre-approvals of candidates. This controlled and limited opening pre-empted demands for substantive democratization. However, the destabilizing potential lies in the repeated exposure of officials to voter assessments and the cultivation of popular expectations for expanded public input. If propagated across regions, controlled consultations could shift the political culture in more participatory directions that undermine CCP ideological claims.

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Discussion and Conclusion

A comparative analysis of the two case studies reveals several notable differences in the stabilizing and destabilizing trade-offs that deliberative processes can generate within authoritarian regimes. In terms of stabilizing effects, the Zeguo study demonstrated more direct buy-in from citizens and tangible responsiveness from local officials through the commitment to implement highly-rated infrastructure projects. This boosted transparency and government legitimacy more meaningfully than the Ya'an electoral approach, which generated no binding authority over personnel appointments. On the other hand, the Ya'an elections better maintained CCP control over outcomes and prevented any shifts in underlying political dominance. The presence of pre-vetting and party-loyalist candidates ensured limited challenge to regime power. In contrast, the ad hoc nature of Zeguo polls granted participants wider latitude to question spending priorities outside strict ideological bounds. Over the long term, fostering civic expectations for direct input, as in Zeguo, may be harder to contain. 
Regarding destabilizing risks, Ya'an faced criticism over permitting even symbolic electoral participation and the potential exposure of leaders to populist judgments. Nevertheless, discord was minimized by alignment with central directives. On the contrary, Zeguo's imposition of deliberative polls absent CCP pre-approval sparked more unease over ideological deviation, despite presenting little substantive threat presently. 
Lastly, a key trade-off emerges in cushioning performance failures: Zeguo's responsiveness allowed citizens to correct local spending imbalances but retained centralized control to prevent broader dissent. Conversely, Ya'an elections provided a symbolic voice but no accountability over officials, offering limited pressure release valves should policies falter. In essence, both examples of deliberative practices are effective in enhancing regime stability on some dimensions, regardless of exacerbating vulnerabilities in others. As a consequence, incremental reforms can sustain autocratic rule unless paired with unpredictable exogenous shocks. 
 

Subsequently, Xi Jinping's intolerance of dissent and demand for total ideological conformity have critically undermined the limited flexibility authoritarian deliberation previously granted China's governance. By concentrating decision-making exclusively at the top and stifling feedback from below, Xi has paralyzed channels through which policies could be adapted early, should they falter. Officials now have incentives to hide failures rather than remedy grievances. Nevertheless, this brittleness is obscured presently by strong economic performance and nationalist propaganda. However, external shocks could swiftly catalyse unpredictable legitimacy crises absent pressure release valves - severely testing deliberation's limitations. The CCP previously balanced deliberation's trade-offs by boosting legitimacy without meaningful democratization. But space for pluralistic input, already narrow, has drastically contracted under Xi's rigid authoritarianism. Deliberative forums have markedly decreased, with censorship, arrests and propaganda replacing modest flexibility. Where local experiments in controlled deliberation earlier provided modest avenues for representation and accountability, now an ideological straightjacket precludes reform discussions entirely. Perpetual equilibrium appears impossible, given strained channels. With no outlet, pressures are more likely to rupture violently when suppressed tensions trigger systemic demands for change. 
 

It is important to acknowledge some key limitations in studying China's deliberative practices and their impacts on authoritarianism. Information access poses a significant challenge, as accurate and thorough data is difficult to obtain given China's opaque political system. The limited publicly available data may constrain the analysis, potentially resulting in gaps in understanding the full range of deliberative behaviours across China's regimes and localities. Additionally, there is an inherent risk of authoritarian bias when evaluating and interpreting the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of deliberation on the CCP's authoritarian dominance. As outside observers, it can be difficult to assess such impacts objectively without being unduly influenced by the narratives and perspectives propagated by the authoritarian regime itself. Bearing these limitations in mind, it is crucial to strive for an impartial analysis grounded in available evidence while remaining cognizant of possible blind spots.
In essence, China's authoritarian resilience relied partially on limited deliberative flexibility as an internal pressure valve before Xi consolidated control. However, the democratizing potential of deliberation, which was already remote, is now extinct under Xi's rigid model, which is intolerant of adaptive dissent. Calls for flexibility may resurface upon Xi's departure. However, his Leninist authoritarianism leaves no room for bottom-up, pluralistic input to temper policies or governance failures. Stability remains contingent on sustained performance legitimacy, coercion and censorship - absent internal feedback correcting routes before ruptures emerge. Hence, any possibility, however faint, of deliberative practices catalysing gradual reforms from inside the system has vanished under Xi's personalist dictatorship. The facade may endure for decades or crumble unexpectedly in crisis. Either way, deliberation will not be the driver unless dynamics shift fundamentally in China's closed authoritarian system.
 

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