The Minority Body: Rejecting The Social Model of Disability

In the first chapter of her book The Minority Body (2016), the American social philosopher Elizabeth Barnes stipulates the need to merge the various instances of physical disability under an overarching philosophical outlook (Barnes, 2016, pp.9-10). She thus catalogues the four chief criteria that any successful account of disability must respect. Firstly, such an account must provide correct verdicts for paradigm cases (Barnes, 2016, p.10), that is, it must include standard patterns of disability and classify them as such. Secondly, it must not already presuppose that disability is suboptimal (Barnes, 2016, p.11). Otherwise, this assumption could affect the first criterion and consequently over- or under-generalise what counts as disability. Thirdly, it must be effectively explanatory (Barnes, 2016, p.12). It cannot merely aggregate examples of disability; it also needs to clearly elucidate the common features that they all share. Lastly, and strictly connected to the previous point, it must not be circular (Barnes, 2016, p.13), in the sense that it must not contain the concept of disability in its definition of disability. 

 

Having clarified this, Barnes proceeds to appraise the currently prevailing outlooks on disability. The social model of disability purports that disability is socially constructed and that disabilities can be unified under the negative effects that ableist discrimination has on people with impairments (Barnes, 2016, pp.24-25). Barnes argues that this model does not seem to properly follow the requirements previously listed. She begins by claiming that its explanatory work is insufficient and in this respect,  rebuffs the third criterion. Indeed, in stating that all the negative effects of disability originate solely from social prejudice and never from impairments, the social model merely re-adjusts the scope of the investigation on impairments rather than on disability itself without solving said investigation or outlining what these impairments consist of (Barnes, 2016, p.25-27). Moreover, it is ultimately discounting all those disabilities that cause chronic pain (Barnes, 2016, p.27), therefore discarding the first criterion as well. For these reasons, Barnes views the social model results as unsatisfactory (Barnes, 2016, p.25).

 

Re-evaluation of The Social Model of Disability

I believe that Barnes is too hasty in dismissing the social model and that a more cohesive account is attainable by subjugating the notion of compulsory able-bodiedness to patriarchy. In what follows, I will first draw on work by Robert McRuer (2002) and subsequently expand on his thesis. In this regard, I will argue that the system that introduces compulsory able-bodiedness is not industrial capitalism, as McRuer himself suggests, but rather patriarchy. I will examine the concept of patriarchy through the republican sense of liberty and describe it as the arbitrary power that subsumes the social collective under a restricted elite of privileged individuals.

 

As McRuer recognises, in contemporary Western cultures, the notion of disability and the subsequent harmful prejudice against it originate from the conceptual entity of able-bodiedness. As able-bodiedness is associated with health and disability is portrayed as the opposite of able-bodiedness, disability becomes associated with a lack of health. This is not merely a theoretical issue; to the contrary, this dynamic reinforces societal norms that able-bodiedness is the default preferred bodily condition. Consequently, physical figures that differ from the supposed default are seen as abnormal, which leads them to being neglected by and omitted from society. Following this logic, McRuer establishes that the compulsory element of able-bodiedness develops precisely from this introduction of normalcy (McRuer, 2002, p. 302). 

 

From these considerations, it is possible to delineate a preliminary social conception of disability as incorporating any bodily condition differing from the normalcy of able-bodiedness. McRuer suggests that the system that engenders the dichotomy of compulsory able-bodiedness and disability is contingent on the system that engenders that of compulsory heterosexuality and queerness. This happens because both dichotomies are founded on the same pattern: the imposition of normalcy on able-bodiedness and heterosexuality, and the subsequent subjugation of, respectively, disability and queerness to them.  Thus, McRuer suggests, this common pattern must be achieved through contingent systems operating together. McRuer then proceeds by exploring solely the system that he considers responsible for the former dichotomy - compulsory able-bodiedness and disability - and that he identifies with the rise of 19th century industrial capitalism. Indeed, by valuing people’s worth depending on their ability to conduct physical labour, industrial capitalism seems to have originated the prejudicial association between able-bodiedness and bodily health. Being able-bodied equals possessing a healthy body, that is, one that is “capable of the physical exertions required from it” (Oxford English Dictionary cited in McRuer, 2002, p.303). However, I argue that a profounder societal analysis would hold that the system producing these dichotomies is one and the same, rather than two contingent yet different ones, and that said common system is precisely patriarchy. 
 

A Patriarchally Normative Account on Disability

Before delving into a patriarchally normative account on disability, it is paramount to clarify the main concept this account relies on: republican liberty. The republican sense of liberty depicts freedom as non-domination and interference as the potentiality of arbitrary, unjustified power over said freedom (Pettit, 2006). Its interpretation thus diverges greatly from the default discourse on liberty, inaugurated by the Russian-British philosopher Isaiah Berlin and grounded on the dichotomy between negative and positive freedom. According to Berlin’s perspective, the former encompasses the absence of external agency and constraints from one’s own exercise of freedom. By contrast, the latter is concerned with the individual’s internal desires and freedom to action to achieve self-mastery (1969).

 

When it is contemplated in this sense, patriarchy comes to express the systemic arbitrary power that privileges a restricted elite of individuals – namely, white, rich, heterosexual, cisgender, and able-bodied men  – over anyone who does not present the same favouring qualities. By doing so, patriarchy promotes these qualities not only as the dominant, but most importantly, as the normal and preferred social categories, to which everything else must be subjugated. It then becomes manifest that compulsory able-bodiedness and disability (as well as heterosexuality and queerness) are inextricably opposite on a conceptual level yet unequal on a cultural one. Accordingly, my preliminary social conception of disability can now be broadened to include these supplementary reflections and therefore come to identify any bodily condition differing from the patriarchally normative practice of able-bodiedness. 

 

I advocate that my thesis offers a more interconnected social approach to disability by successfully exhausting Bernes’ criteria and avoiding the issues generally attributed to social models. Firstly, due to its oppositeness to able-bodiedness, it intuitively encompasses all the paradigm instances of disability. Secondly, it does not already presuppose disability to be suboptimal, or, at least, not in a self-defeating way. It is understandable that, for the motives summarised so far, a patriarchal context is inclined to consider disability as bad. Nevertheless, this does not render such an intuition any more justifiable; on the contrary, it contributes to exposing the cultural biases we are subjected to, thus summoning us to hold ourselves liable for them. Thirdly, since the definition of disability does not contain the concept of disability, my account is not circular. It does imply the concept of able-bodiedness, but, as mentioned previously, the latter is regarded as a privileging factor that fabricates the concept of disability as its opposite; thus, it cannot assume it in advance. Lastly, it is efficiently explanatory: not only does this account unify disabilities under their differentiation from able-bodiedness, it also integrates them into a cohesive understanding of the discriminations – such as homophobia, racism, islamophobia, and so on - perpetrated by society. 

 

Accordingly, I judge that my patriarchally normative account of disability can be maintained in respect to Barnes’ metrics. 

 

Criticisms

Despite its ostensible soundness, there are still two critiques that might arise against my thesis. The first one claims that, in overlooking physical and mental impairments, my conception of disability ends up detaching disability from disabled people’s individual experiences. As such, it does not fully conform to Barnes’ first criterion and must be disproven.

 

I believe that this objection misunderstands both my and Barnes’ views. Firstly, as I recalled in the synopsis, Barnes’ third criterion inevitably leads any philosophical account to elude the uniqueness of those occurrences; otherwise, an analytic stance on disability would be utterly impracticable. However, I also deem that my thesis manages to provide an objective definition of disability without generalising its singular occurrences. Accordingly, it encompasses paradigm cases of disabilities while concurrently preserving the subjectivity entailed by various disabled experiences. My thesis thus still complies with Barnes’ first criterion and therefore rebuts this objection.

 

The second critique concerns Barnes’ interpretation of the ameliorative project (Haslanger, 2014, cited in Barnes, 2016, p.39). As she explains, the latter “asks us to consider what role [social] categories have to play in social progress” and why it would be important to have a theory on said social categories (Barnes, 2016, p.40-41). In this respect, Barnes purports that disability is both socially and philosophically interesting because of the fundamental role it plays in the disability rights movements (Barnes, 2016, p.41). A philosophical outlook on disability must therefore reflect this chief feature; however, my social conception of disability seems to ignore it and would thus be dismissed as incomplete along these lines.

 

This is indeed an objection that could hazardously undermine my thesis; nevertheless, I deem that it can be contested by enhancing my thesis with the reactionary measure suggested by McRuer at the end of his article (McRuer, 2002, pp.306-307). In this logic, the hegemony of patriarchy is constituted on the feeble eulogy of normal able-bodiedness, which is merely an abstracted concept and, therefore, intrinsically unachievable by real bodies. This explains why McRuer maintains that we are all virtually disabled, both because the norms on able-bodies are, in themselves, “impossible to embody,” and because the mental and physical status of able-bodiedness is always temporary; it can be “revoked” at any time. As such, it consequently follows that it is precisely the discriminated, less tolerated bodies – namely, disabled ones – that hold more power to both disclose this inconsistency within patriarchy and to subvert it. On a more concrete level, this means that disabled people can challenge ableist prejudices and discrimination by merely existing in our society. Indeed, it is through the existence of something explicitly labelled as abnormal that we become aware of the harmful concept of normalcy in the first place and of the necessity to fight against it. This is then amplified by the disability rights movement, which contributes to this philosophical fight while celebrating the social and cultural pride of disability. I believe that this characterisation of disability successfully associates my thesis with Barnes’ ameliorative project, demonstrating that it can still be endorsed.

 

Patriarchy: The Persistent State of Collective Republican Unfreedom

By following the direction hinted at in the previous paragraph, it is possible to further explore the idea that, in patriarchy, all of our bodies are virtually disabled, thus further corroborating the intrinsic inconsistency of patriarchy. To do this, it is first helpful to investigate the intricate consequences of the patriarchal imposition of a dominant social category. 

 

As I explained above, the marginalisation of entire communities of people is grounded on a specific set of favouring qualities and perpetrated by an elite of individuals who possess such qualities – white, rich, heterosexual, cis-gender, able-bodied men. Yet, contrary to popular belief, patriarchy somehow manages to constrain even this privileged elite. In fact, since masculinity embodies the dominant-normal social practice and is stereotypically associated with men, men’s own methods of self-expression are limited to the traits stereotypically attributed to masculine personalities. This demonstrates that even men are subject to patriarchal laws and, consequently, that in a patriarchal context, every single individual finds themselves oppressed in a persistent state of collective republican unfreedom. 

 

These elucidations are applicable to my patriarchally normative account of disability. In fact, this collective republican unfreedom aliments the preferred social perspectives that patriarchy normalises. That is, our state of collective republican unfreedom reinforces precisely the concept of compulsory normalcy, by which different, abnormal perspectives are discriminated against. Moreover, since we are all subject to a persistent state of unfreedom, it consequently follows that we are contemporarily all subject to compulsory normalcy. This means that the privileged elite cannot exhaustively embody the patriarchal norms it is expected to abide by either. This precisely reinforces McRuer’s suggestion that we are all virtually disabled. We constantly fail at meeting the necessary conditions for able-bodiedness because able-bodiedness is intrinsically unachievable. Nevertheless, it is paramount to acknowledge that, even within the subjugation of the entire social collective to normalcy, there exist different degrees of this republican unfreedom based solely on the privileges that subjects can still exhibit. For instance, a white rich woman is more privileged and thus less unfree than a black poor woman because of both her ethnicity and her class. Accordingly, a disabled white man is less privileged and thus more unfree than an able-bodied white man because of his different bodily or mental conditions. 

 

In light of these overall considerations, we can investigate whether the term disability can come to incorporate a broader spectrum of human conditions. In fact, in my patriarchally normative account, disability does not seem to be restricted to physical or mental impairments, as I have explained in my response to the first criticism. However, disability cannot become so general as to include the temporarily normalised characteristics of the privileged elite. Accordingly, the term disability can serve as an umbrella term that covers all characteristics - whether ethnic, financial, sexual, and so on - that do not conform to what is currently normalised in our society. For instance, we can consider disabled someone who is black, or a woman, or queer, or poor, precisely because their conditions and personal characteristics do not conform to societal norms and stereotypes. This thus creates a sort of privileging hierarchy that culminates in the elite of individuals previously cited and that influences every aspect of human life, especially human agency. In this optic, in fact, the possibilities of free action praised by positive liberty turn out to be illusions that patriarchy sporadically offers to a limited set of people selected purely because of their privilege. This is the case of the so-called self-made man, the one in a million who beat the odds and climbed the social ladder. According to this idea, he is not self-made at all; he was able to achieve his goals because patriarchy let him. He is simply the occasional winner that patriarchy selects to persuade the collective that possibilities exist for everyone without discrimination and that it is the individual’s responsibility to take advantage of them. Through this fabricated narrative, patriarchy manages to elude collective insurrections and thus preserve its own existence. 

 

Conclusion

In conclusion, in this essay, I attempted to advance a patriarchally normative conception of disability by applying McRuer’s theory on compulsory able-bodiedness to the Western patriarchal context. In this respect, I analysed Barnes’ necessary criteria for a successful account of disability and accordingly determined that my approach would respect all four of them. I then proceeded to defend my thesis from two acutely persuasive critiques against its alleged adequacy. I then endeavoured to further corroborate the intrinsic inconsistency of patriarchy through a more profound investigation of the dominant-normal social practices and the collective republican unfreedom that it generates. Lastly, I suggested a connection between said collective republican unfreedom and the patriarchal introduction of normalcy. On this matter, I resorted to McRuer’s suggestion that we are all virtually disabled to propose the word disability as an umbrella term for all those human perspectives that do not conform to societal normalcy.

 

Thus, I trust that my thesis can be maintained. Patriarchy may applaud its hierarchical system of competition and mass destruction, but life and our different experiences are dear to humans, and we will defend them.

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Bibliography

 

Barnes, E. (2016). The Minority Body. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

McRuer, R. (2002). Compulsory Able-Bodiedness and Queer/Disabled Existence. In Breuggeman, B., Garland-Thomson, R. and Snyder, S.L., eds. Disabilities Studies: Enabling the Humanities. New York: Modern Language Association of America. pp.301-308.

 

Pettit, P. (2006). The Republican Ideal of Freedom. In D. Miller, ed. The Liberty Reader. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

 

As inspiration for the conclusion: 

Shelley, M. W. (1818). Frankenstein. London: Penguin Classics. ​​

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